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In memory of Tadeusz Mazowiecki,
Prime Minister of the first non-communist government in Central and Eastern
Europe,
the spiritus movens of the Polish Constitution of April, 2, 1997  
The Polish constitution, unlike the German which will celebrate its 7-O on 23 May of
this year, has no big birthday scheduled this year. Nevertheless, the  22. anniversary
of the Polish constitution on 2 April offers a good opportunity to ponder about
the Constitution’s performance so far, to appreciate its resilience, to celebrate
its many achievements and, last but not least,  to map out its possible future
trajectory. Tracking the birth and life of this constitutional document takes on special
importance today at the height of the Polish counterrevolution. Many virtues of the
Constitution got lost amidst the ongoing humiliation that the Constitution has been
subject to at the hands of the right-wing government. The latter keeps portraying it
as an elitist document that allegedly never served the interests of true Polish people
and one that betrayed the ethos of the Solidarity movement. A rejoinder to this
narrative is very much in order. 
A new constitutional narrative on the rise
The 1997 Constitution is rejected by the ruling PIS party as an extension of the
rotten compromise struck during the Round Table Talks in 1989. Kaczynski’s mantra
is that “true Polish constitution” was never adopted post-1989. According to him an
opportunity presents itself now to finally adopt a righteous constitution for Polish
people. The constitutional document of PIS would not only entrench its grip on
power, but first and foremost fortify its leader’s outrageous rewriting of post-1989
history (allegedly, Poles owe the 2004 EU Accession to the efforts of the Kaczy#ski
brothers, while NATO membership has been secured thanks to none else than
Jaros#aw Kaczy#ski, to name but two examples of many, while Lech Wa##sa is now
cast aside as a traitor and collaborator with the communists … )
What about the main “culprit” then: the 1997 Constitution? 
- 1 -
Understanding the “here and now” by looking back  
After 1989, day-to-day politics and the effort of patching together a disjointed political
scene quickly overshadowed the peaceful transition. Choices of constitutional
design hardly explain the real failures in leadership and frailties in temperament
that ensued post-1989. Paradoxically, if anybody is to blame for the disintegration
of Solidarno## in the 1990’s, and for the gradual erosion of its myth(s), it has been
the leaders themselves who lost the very spirit that brought them together in the
70’s and 80’s. Constitution-making process is a function of political context and
what is possible in the factual and legal register. In the Polish case the factual was
dominated by the temperamental deficiencies of the Polish leading revolutionary
Lech Wa##sa. Polish People did not turn their back on politics just because it failed
to bring forth a reasonable constitutional compromise after 1989, or because a
wrong constitutional blueprint was chosen at the Founding. We always excelled
in instinctive and emotional resistance against the dark forces that plotted against
our country. Victimization and messianism were used to explain, and justify, the
special place of Poland in history, as opposed to the allegedly boring and uninspiring
process of political compromise. 
Would then a revolutionary and imaginary constitution of 1991/1992 really have
made any difference as is often claimed by those who oppose the Round Table
Talks of 1989? Would such a document have been treated any differently than the
Constitution of 1997? Would it have garnered more support because of its proximity
to, and feeding off the high-energy politics that drove Solidarno## and the systemic
transitions of 1989? Given the powerful forces in play back then, the deep political
polarization and the sweeping politics of paranoia that always drove Kaczy#ski, there
is simply not enough evidence to answer these questions in the affirmative. The
political polarisation and party fractions already present in the first few years after
1989 were of such an intensity that any reasonable constitutional compromise was
unattainable.
Toxic constitutional brew: What drives Kaczy#ski ?
Jaros#aw Kaczy#ski had from the outset been a passionate opponent of anything
that came out of the fateful Round Table Agreement in Magdalenka in 1989. An
imaginary 1991/1992 Constitution would have been met with the same fierce
resistance than the one adopted in 1997 Constitution. Kaczy#ski despises the III
Republic born in 1989 for its original sin at birth rather than for any wrong choices
and calculations made in 1990 and 1992. Declaring the Round Table Talks a
sham was exactly what forged the anti-liberal, ultra-catholic and nationalistic
program in governance today. Kaczy#ski was poisoning the public discourse with his
conspiracy theories and combative discourse, hijacking the ethos and myth of the old
Solidarno## for his personal political ambitions and for his own vision of how Poland
should have looked like post-1989. 
One of the founding myths of Kaczy#ski’s IV Republic project (restarted in November
2015) claims that only the few righteous and virtuous founders of the PC  (mother
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party of what is today’s PIS) carried on the true legacy of Solidarno## betrayed at
the Round Table Talks by the Mazowieckis, Geremeks, Michniks and others. While
in the 90’s the foundations of the new Poland were laid down and the brighter future
beckoned after 50 years of living under the thumb of the Soviet oppression, the
same period of time for Kaczy#ski and his believers was shrouded in darkness and
unfulfilled ambitions. The electoral victory in 2015 and its aftermath simply released
his pent-up anger and hatred toward III Republic of 1989 – 2015.    
Debunking the myths and appreciating the
Constitution we have
Now back to 1997 Constitution.One has to appreciate the strong claim to legitimacy
that this Constitution makes, and the spirit that informed its adoption. The political
and constitutional compromise that was missing in the first years post-89 was
clearly on display in 1996 and 1997 during the work on the draft. The makeup of
the National Assembly that adopted the Constitution on April, 2, 1997 reflected
the drive for compromise. The latter brought together moderate forces of the SLD
(post-communist left), UD (Democratic Union), UP (Labour Union) and PSL (Polish
Peasants Party). One of the founding Fathers of this Constitution and driving force
behind its celebrated preamble was Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the first non-communist
Prime Minister in Eastern Europe. Who else could have better represented the spirit
of Solidarno## and the ethos of working for the common good than him?
The 1997 Constitution proved its durability at the moment of greatest national
tragedy post-1945: the crash of the presidential plane in Smole#sk in 2010). It
provided a framework for orderly alternation in power and government formation,
and finally anchored Poland in NATO and the European Union. Its Preamble is
the best reflection of Solidarno## as it brings together all the voices that speak for
contemporary Poland. It is a document that is inclusive and inviting, never exclusive. 
Granted, Solidarno## was truly a revolutionary movement that changed history
and paved the way for changes in the Eastern and Central Europe and beyond.
However, Solidarno## never delivered political goods when given a chance
post-1989. Paradoxically, the great and tangible constitutional achievements of the
last 27 years happened thanks to the efficient and persistent efforts by the forces
that, in fact, emerged from the rubbles of the Communist Party and that were joined
by the moderates that carried on the legacy of Solidarno##’s spirit of reconciliation
and compromise. 
Understanding the constitution through its path
The commitments owed to a constitutional document are anchored in the past,
developed and refined in the present, and carried over into the future. These three
temporal dimensions are linked by the rationale of the underlying principles and
values that make up the constitutional identity and must be interpreted to ensure
both the continuity of the messages contained therein and their durability. What is
needed is an equilibrium between necessary change that embraces the new and
- 3 -
stability that caters tothe traditional. In other words, constitutional interpretation must
strive both for the conservative (preserving the values) and the reformative (reading
these in the light of ever-changing circumstances). The future will then emerge at
the intersection of both perspectives. This temporal understanding underscores an
aspirational function of a constitutional document: it aspires to reflect the country in
the best, albeit imperfect way, to capture this reflection, and yet it will never achieve
this goal in a definite and final way, since society not only changes and evolves
along with the document but is also always constrained by baggage of the past.     
Each generation must undertake its own distinctive role in spelling out what the
constitutional pact mandates. Constitutional fidelity underpins this process and
arises at the intersection of practice, text, interpretation, and culture.  In this sense,
constitutional fidelity is about a generational reading of the document, not uncritical
iconoclasm. It is about pragmatic recognition that our constitutional allegiances are
shaped, reshaped, and re-examined as the world around the constitution changes
and fluctuates. There is no place for fear of failure because failure is a part of
fidelity. No constitution is perfect. Fidelity is about the journey and the process
rather than a final destination. Each generation should build on the best of the
past and progress with this knowledge. Constitutional pacting is at its best when
people (not only lawyers) see themselves as part of the constitutional process from
nation-building through self-discovery to nation-sustaining and growth. Fidelity is not
about logic but instead a sense of belonging, emotion, tradition, and history. These
factors combined define the contours and durability of the fidelity to the constitution
and provides a chance to advance as a nation of all, not only chosen ones. True
constitutional fidelity never comes down as a blessing from the empowered  but is
born and thrives in peoples’ hearts. Fidelity to the Polish Constitution should be an
expression of loyalty to the great moments in Polish history that are marked by a
plurality of voices and respect for the other with the Polish tradition of openness and
tolerance. The 1997 Constitution is only part of this tradition. Elements of tolerance
– rule of law, democracy, freedoms and rights, a functioning system of judicial
protection, and a constitutional court with a strong record of human rights protection
– are built on the tradition of limited government, separation of powers, centrality of
the individual, and respect for self-imposed rules. This is where the unifying potential
resides. 
Finally,a constitution that aspires to be “good” must not only engage with aspiration
and pacting, but also command respect via constitutional context. A good
constitution helps to build a constitutional context defined by the lower courts’
application of the Constitution in individual cases. Once citizens start seeing that
their constitutional rights and freedoms are real and effective (context), the rights
are not merely illusory (text), and that courts translate the text into context, important
transformations will happen. The citizens will not only be willing to stand up for a
constitution, but most crucially, they will understand why this constitution and the
institutions must be defended. 
A constitution is well-designed to ensure stable democracy when the elites’ project
meets and is enforced by what S. Levitsky and D. Ziblatt, call strong informal
norms and practices that prevent the democracies from self-destructing. They
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argue that “like a pickup basketball game without a referee, democracies work
best when unwritten rules of the game, known and respected by all the players,
ensure a minimum of civility and cooperation. Norms serve as the soft guardrails
of democracy, preventing political competition from spiralling into a chaotic, no-
holds-barred conflict”. A constitution is good for citizens not because it promises
the moon or engages with the strategy of generous give-aways (this was an
underlying assumption of communist paper constitutions that promised a lot yet
never delivered). A good constitution protects citizens against the authorities’
arbitrariness. 
Unless citizens want to complete an obituary for the rule of law in 2019, the
challenge should be clear. Improving constitutional safeguards against the excesses
of any majority is of the upmost importance but insufficient. Instead, it is necessary
to move beyond text and on to building the context in which a constitution will
prosper. This context would rely on citizens approving the bottom-up constitutional
design, showing citizens how the institutions work, explaining the importance of an
independent judiciary and the rule of law, and demonstrating how the constitution
matters in their daily lives. The constitution strengthened via context would become
internalized in citizens’ hearts and minds. Such transformation would serve as the
best precaution against any authoritarian-prone governments and parliaments.
Capture in Poland has been so deadly effective due to a lack of constitutional
context and minimal internalization of the constitution by citizens.
While democracy tells how to gain political power and implement the political
agenda, constitutionalism puts a premium on learning how to govern in the
culture of limited government, restraint, and responsibility for the common good.
Constitutionalism is about limited government and controlling state power by legal
means. The resentful constitutions of fear must be challenged by a narrative built
around “a good constitution“. 
A good constitution not only empowers but also delimits and sets the boundaries
where power is to be exercised. It helps build and sustain liberal platforms of equal
citizens. Democracy thrives on many voices, and a good constitution reflects this
multiplicity. “A good constitution” is anchored in the most cherished of reservoirs –
the hearts and minds of citizens. As soon as that happens, the politics of resentment
face a new powerful adversary in the form of conscious and engaged citizenry. 
When the constitutional order is captured, popular support could provide a critical
emergency mechanism to prevent its destruction. Kim Lane Scheppele spoke of
“successful constitutions” and argued that they manage to create their own social
life by “naturalising, channelling and/or legitimating power”. They “extend the idea
of constitutionalism beyond any constitutional text and beyond the directly regulated
political classes into a broader social world in which constitutional ideas shape
social expectations and understandings, and come to be taken for granted. They
rely on a general understanding of constitutionalism both in the political elite and
in a broader public. Her insights help explain the importance of what I would call
“constitutional life on the ground”. Indeed if there is one thing authoritarians like
Orbán and Kaczy#ski fear, it is the voice and constitutional engagement that come
from within the civil society. 
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The 1997 Constitution as a focal point for
constitutional resistance
The Constitutions could create democracies after a non-democratic time. But, the
law alone is insufficient to build a stable democracy. The rule of law and democracy
must be internalized at the behavioral level. The important study of regimes needs
to be complemented by studying the attitudes of people subject to a democratic rule.
How do they respond to democracy? How do they define it? How do they internalize
democratic values? These questions merit close attention as further encroachments
by the politics of resentment continue. There is no democracy without democrats,
and the democracy on the periphery provides an example of a regime in which
hybridity is reinforced by the ambivalent incoherence of individuals. The latter group
struggles to internalize all the democratic rules (inclusion, tolerance, respect for the
other, and constitutional culture). Their understanding of the democratic processes
is superficial and shallow. It comes down to voting in four-year electoral cycles.
There has not been much knowledge beyond the ballot-box in terms of constitutional
culture, which is understood as non-judicial actors’ beliefs and values about the
constitution. 
The 1997 Constitution is a „a good Constitution”. It is a Constitution that
encapsulates the spirit of Solidarno## both in terms of pedigree and content. The
authoritarian policies of the current government are antithesis of what was the most
precious about the Solidarno## movement that rose in the 80-s and triumphed in
the 1989. The 1997 Constitution is a constitution of an open society and is therefore
begrudged by the politics of resentment. It has survived because it is based on a
compromise among competing world-views and invites all to join in the journey.
Constituents must never let the resentful government, or any other would-be
authoritarians, tell them it is any different. This Constitution deserves to be defended.
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